

/The Cover/

No. Hei. Matters decided upon as the opinion of the Army in the beginning of July 1933.

/Handwritings on the first page/

Top Secret /stamp/ /Reference/

No. Hei. Document received from Lt. Col. SUZUKI on 12th July 1933, with the note that as the War Ministry and the Army General Staffs have unanimously agreed on the following gist of the policy, it is desired that the Government will decide its policies along the lines of this document.
MORISHIMA /signed/ 6 July 1933.

The Gist of Policy towards China

The Policy.

Through availing ourselves of the indications in North China of the improvement of its attitude towards Japan and expanding the effect of the Truce Agreement, we must make it actually cast aside its past anti-Japan and Manchukuo policy, and destroy the actual influence of the National Party and extend this tendency to the South. On the other hand, our attitude towards the Nanking Government should be rigorous enough to distinguish between right and wrong as in the past and pressure should be placed upon it by proper measures to make it change its anti-Japan policy or to compel it to fall in self-collapse as a result of the pressure of domestic problems, the rapprochement toward Japan of Chinese civilians, especially economic circles, and our prevention of foreign aids to China.

The Gist of Measures

1. Though we would tolerate, for the time being, the North China Regime to remain as an extension of the Nanking Government, we should press the faithful fulfillment of the Truce Agreement in its broad sense, the extermination of the boycott on Japanese goods and anti-Japanese activities, and the maintenance and expansion of such a situation.

2. We must make the North China Regime suppress the National Party's anti-Japanese activities in North China and make the party gradually reduce itself until its final dissolution.

3. We must give positive guidance to the prominent persons, economic elements and thought bodies in North China desirous of the abolition of the anti-Japanese policy, and also encourage the North China Regime to become pro-Japanese and to make efforts for the restoration of its co-existing relation with Japan and Manchukuo.

4. We must give appropriate assistance to the principal military regimes which are supporting the North China Regime and others with a tinge of anti-Chiang but who are not anti-Japan in principle, which will help the North China Regime turn pro-Japanese.

5. We must, through the North China Regime, endeavor to propagate the situation in North China into Central China.

6. Towards the Nanking Government, we should strictly reprimand its injustice and urge it to reconsider and also declare our determination for chastising it, even by force if necessary, so as to make it suppress the anti-Japanese activities of Party Organs in Central China and make it actually give up its policies of anti-Japanism and boycotting Japanese goods. Unless the Nanking Government actually changes its past policies or someone else who stands on a moderate and fair platform takes its place, we should neither approach it nor try to call for a positive negotiation. With regard to the matters of this paragraph, it is imperative for each and every circle of our country to cooperate. Particularly, those who serve abroad must be appropriate personnel.

7. Either by our guidance behind the scene or some other means we must eliminate from the civil and military heads of the Nanking Government pro-European and American elements, so they would be replaced by pro-Japanese and Asiatic ones. By doing so we must make the center of it gradually shake itself free from the tinge of National Party, with its influences over the government reduced until the Nanking Government would neither stick to the traditional policy of the National Party, nor be influenced by anti-Japanese elements other than the National Party.

8. By giving guidance and support to our business concerns for their establishing and practising free handed transaction with China in defiance of the policies of the Nanking Government, we intend to realize our substantial economic advance into China which might become a factor to influence the Nanking Government to change its policy towards Japan.

9. We should take advantage of the anti-Chiang activities in the South Western and other districts so far as they are not anti-Japanese, as they would encourage and promote the neutralization of the anti-Japanese policies of the Nanking Government.

10. We should prevail on Chinese settlers in the South Seas to distract from the National Government of the National Party and to become inclined to Manchukuo with the Japanese influence as its background, so that they may contribute to the perfection of Manchukuo and the adjustment of the relations between Japan and China.

11. We should make every possible effort to prevent the foreign powers, especially U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R. from expanding their influences over China and from giving support to it. At the same time we must impress upon the Chinese people and the government officials the impoverished economic conditions of those foreign powers and make them understand their ambitions over China and their untrustworthiness.

12. The policies taken by the Nanking Government up to now based on the platform of the National Party have been permanently and fundamentally contradictory to the Empire's policies. We, therefore, should proclaim to the world that the Imperial Government as well as its people shall be hostile to the Nanking Government as long as it does not alter its past attitude towards Japan, but that we are willing to shake hands with China and her people under justifiable and fair conditions at the earliest possible date.

13. If our government is convinced that the Nanking Government actually gave up its anti-Japanese and Japanese goods boycotting policies and approached us with good faith, we will never hesitate to proceed on the solution of the pending issues between Japan and China, of which a separate study shall be made.

Doc. 3147C

昭和八年八月三十一日

昭和八年九月綴込

(秘)

對支方針參考資料其一 ヨリノ沿革

宇島用

丙号、昭和八年七月初陸軍意見ニシテ決定セルモノ

昭和八年七月十一日鈴木中佐ヨリ 送附越シ

極秘其際本要綱ハ陸軍トシテハ省部ノ意見ニ一致セルモノナルカ
此趣旨ニ依ル政府方針決定ヲ希望ストノ申出アリタリ 宇島

對支政策方針要綱

昭和八、七、六

方針

北支ニ於ケル對日態度轉向、北ヲ捉ヘ停戰協定ノ效果ヲ擴充
シ北支政權ヲシテ實質的ニ反日及兩政策ヲ放棄セシメ且國民黨
ノ實勢力ヲ減殺シ漸次此情勢ヲ南方ニ波及スルハ指導スル
ト共ニ南京政府對シテ依然然是ヲ是トシ非ヲ非トスル如ク
正不動ノ態度ヲ持シ且適當ノ方法ヲ以テ之ニ圧力ヲ加ヘ支那
自体ノ國內問題ヨリ来リ重圧、支那民間特ニ其經濟界等
對日直接列強支那援助ニ對シ抑制等ト相俟テ遂ニ
其對日政策ヲ轉換スルカ若ハ自ラ崩潰没落ノ已ムヲ得ル
ニ至ラシムルヲ以テ方針トス

對策要綱

一、北支政權ニ對シテハ差當リ南京政府ノ延長ヲハ形態姑ク之
ヲ默認スト雖飽ミ迄停戰協定ノ意義ニテ且忠實ナル
履行ヲ要スルト共ニ排日排貨行動ハ之ヲ現實ニ終熄セシ
ム更ニ此狀態ヲ維持補充ス
二、北支政權ヲシテ北支ニ於テ國民黨本部ノ反日的活動ヲ抑止

Doc. 3147C

No. 2

- セシ外餘三處部、政綱縮小、終局於之、解決見
三、此、指導等又
- 三、北支、於、排日放棄、剝奪之、西人、經濟界、思想團
體等、對、積極的指導等、加、北支政權、親日轉向、助成
之、且北支、對日、滿、依存關係、復、活、カ、ス
- 四、北支、於、政權、及、持、ツ、主要軍權、及、反蔣的、色彩、
有、志、軍閥、中、抗、日、根本、趣旨、ト、サ、レ、又、對、之、適、宜、指導
ヲ、加、北支政權、親日轉向、助成、カ、ス
- 五、北支政權、通、北支情勢、中、支、政、及、カ、ス
- 六、南京政府、對、之、其、非、能、迄、之、責、以、其、及、者、促、之、
要、之、武力、以、之、應、徵、ス、決、意、ヲ、明、ニ、漸、次、同、政府、
シ、中、共、部、少、心、之、黨、部、抗、日、策、勸、ヲ、抑、止、之、抗、日、排、日、
政策、現、實、放棄、セ、ル、也、如、指導、又、而、之、彼、政策、現、
實、轉、換、ス、力、又、穩、健、中、正、之、政策、ヲ、實、施、ス、者、之、代、ヲ、
限、リ、我、方、ヲ、接近、又、積極的、接、衝、ヲ、求、ム、ト、シ、
本、項、問題、之、帝國、各、界、一致、步、調、ヲ、必要、ト、シ、特、不、外
勤、務、者、之、人的、配、置、ヲ、適、正、ス、之、ヲ、要、ス
- 七、裏、面、的、指導、又、其、他、方、法、依、リ、南京政府、首、腦、部、の
至、軍、實、力、ヲ、改、米、親、近、派、除、キ、親、日、派、東、亞、主、義、者、
増、大、シ、策、又、首、腦、者、ヲ、漸、次、國、民、黨、ニ、色、彩、ヲ、脱、シ、
且、黨、部、對、政府、勢力、ヲ、威、殺、又、以、同、政府、ヲ、漸、次、
國、民、黨、之、統、治、政策、膠、着、ス、之、ヲ、カ、シ、又、國、民、黨、以、外
之、反、日、勢力、ヲ、左、右、セ、ル、之、ヲ、要、ス
- 八、我、實、業、界、對、指導、及、又、指、ヲ、予、(南京政府、政策、拘、束

